Wednesday, October 31, 2012

BPAI reverses obviousness rejection after finding combination was "more than the predictable use of a prior art element according to its established function"

Takeaway: The BPAI reversed an obviousness rejection of a claim to a mail processing system after finding that the combination used by the Examiner was "more than the predictable use of a prior art element according to its established function." (Ex parte Ryan, Jr., BPAI 2009.)

Details:

Ex parte Ryan, Jr.
Appeal 2009004014; App. No. 09/777,592 ; Tech. Center 3600
Decided:  September 25, 2009

The application on appeal was directed to a mail processing system. A representative claim on appeal read:

     2. A mail piece verification system for processing mail pieces, the mail pieces having associated therewith respective mail piece data, the system comprising:
     a data center in operative communication with a plurality of mail processing centers,
the data center including a plurality of account files corresponding to a plurality of postage metering systems;
     the data center being adapted to
          store reset data in each of the plurality of account files representative of reset activity associated with the plurality of postage metering systems, respectively;
          receive respective mail piece data corresponding to the mail pieces from the plurality of mail processing centers;
     store empirical data in each of the plurality of account files representative of mailing activity associated with the plurality of postage metering systems, respectively;
     conduct a forensic accounting analysis of the empirical data and the reset data associated with a selected postage metering system using a previously defined time period over which to conduct the forensic accounting analysis; and
     download graphic data to the selected postage metering system to be included in the mail piece data of mail pieces subsequently prepared by the selected postage metering system if the forensic accounting analysis reveals that the empirical data is not consistent with the reset data for the selected postage metering system.
(Emphasis added.)

The Examiner rejected claim 2 as obvious over Hunter, Moore, and Connell. The issue on appeal was whether the combination of Hunter and Connell taught the elements emphasized above.

Specifically, in the Final Office Action the Examiner relied on Hunter for the "conduct a forensic accounting analysis" action, for the claimed "if" condition, and for taking an action – further investigation of possible fraud – in response to the claimed "if" condition. Since Hunter's responsive action was not the claimed "download graphic data" action, the Examiner then relied on Connell as teaching the "download graphic data" action in response to detection of fraud. In explaining how and why these features were combined, the Examiner used the following reasoning:

     To paraphrase in order to explain the rejection in a more simple manner, Hunter detects potential fraud by keeping track of postage value added to a meter, as well as mail pieces from that meter that pass through the postal system. If the postage having been purchased for a meter differs too much from the amount of postage on mail pieces from that meter that have been mailed, this is an indication of potential postage fraud. When such fraud is detected, Hunter initiates a responsive action to deal with the situation. In Hunter, that responsive action is to initiate an investigation (see Hunter, column 5, lines 31-39).
     Of course, claim 1 requires that the responsive action be not an investigation, but a download of graphic data into a meter that gets incorporated onto mail pieces for the purpose of identifying mail pieces originating from suspect meter users. It is necessary to turn to Connell et al. for this portion of the claim limitation.
     Connell et al. is a postal security system that also functions in response to possible postal fraud (see Connell et al., column 1, lines 30-52). Connell et al. works by incorporating graphic data onto mail pieces that indicates whether or not the postage on the mail pieces is legitimate. At any given point in time, there is a particular item of graphic data that is designated as indicating that a mail piece's postage is valid. This designated graphic data changes periodically. In order to keep their "designated graphic data" up-to-date so that their mail pieces are indicated as having valid postage, meter users in Connell et al. must occasionally download the latest version of the designated graphic data. Individuals who are not authorized to be metering mail pieces will not have access to up-to-date designated graphic data, and thus will mail mail pieces with out-of-date graphic data that indicate the mail pieces as potentially fraudulent. Therefore, Connell et al. provides the needed disclosure of graphic data on mail pieces that is used to identify potentially fraudulent mail pieces in response to meter fraud concerns.
     Since the out-of-date graphic data used by a potentially fraudulent user was at one point up-to-date graphic data that was downloaded validly to that user, the out..:of-date graphic
data in Connell et al. that identifies potentially fraudulent data is disclosed as being downloaded
to user meters.

On appeal, the Applicant did not argue the teachings of the individual references, but instead challenged the manner in which the features were combined. Specifically, the Applicant argued that the trigger for Connell's download action was much different from the trigger for Hunter's further investigation action:
[T]he system in Connell selects one of a plurality of stored indicia images [for download] based solely on the date that the indicia will be printed. ... The date has nothing whatsoever to do with whether or not a forensic accounting analysis reveals that the empirical data is not consistent with the reset data. ...  Without using the present claims as a road map, it would not have been obvious to make the multiple, selective modifications needed to arrive at the claimed invention from these references.

In the Answer, the Examiner maintained the rejection and also provided additional explanation.
The use of graphic data to identify postal fraud, as can be seen in the above passages from Connell et al. is a responsive action to the overall problem of postage indicium fraud. While the responsive action in Connell et al. is not a responsive action in the same specific and immediate way that the responsive action in Hunter is, the responsive action in Connell et al. is still a responsive action.
(Emphasis added.)

Also, while the Answer continued to rely on a specific motivation in Connell, the Answer brought in one of the KSR rationales, asserting that the claims “only unite old elements with no change in their respective functions and which yield a predictable result.”

The Board reversed the obviousness rejection. Noting the Examiner's reliance on the "predictable results" rationale from KSR, the Board instead found that the combination used by the Examiner was "more than the predictable use of a prior art element according to its established function." The Board explained this statement as follows:
The Examiner states, “. . . the responsive action in Connell et al. is not a responsive action in the same specific and immediate way that the responsive action in Hunter is . . ..” Answer 26. We agree. While the overall invention in Connell may be directed to the prevention of postage indicia fraud, Connell describes the “responsive action” (i.e. the downloading of an address of a newly authorized indicia) relied upon by the Examiner functions to detect the postage indium fraud. The Examiner’s “responsive action” of Connell is not a response to a detection of an occurrence of postage indicia fraud but is a means that functions to detect an occurrence of the fraud. Connell’s “responsive action” performs the same function as the Hunter’s description of comparing purchased postage with used postage and not the further investigation of Hunter, as the Examiner seems to assert (see Answer 23). Further, Connell’s “responsive action” performs the same function as the claimed forensic analysis and not the claimed downloading of graphic data.  ...  Therefore, we find that the Appellant has shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 2.

My two cents: First, I give credit to the Examiner for providing a detailed explanation of the rejection. Second, I'm glad to see a successful attack on the common "predictable results" rationale. However, I think this fact pattern better fits a proposed-combination-does-not-teach-the-claim argument. That said, I think I figured out how to make the fact pattern fit the predictable results rationale. (Or, more precisely, the UNpredictable results rationale.)

The way I see it, the Examiner's combination rejection takes the form
  • Claim includes action A (forensic analysis), result B (data not consistent) of action A, and action C (downloading graphic data) in response to result B.
  • Hunter teaches action A, result B of action A, and action C' (initiate fraud investigation) in response to result B.
  • Connell teaches action C in response to result B. 
  • Combination results in action A, result B of action A, and action C. 

The Board disagreed with the Examiner's reading of the reference. That is, the Board found that Connell's downloading graphics data was not properly understood as action C in response to result B, but was instead action D (fraud detection). Thus, the Board found that the Examiner's combination did not produce the claim, which required action A, result B of action A, and action C in response to result B.

That's why I see the Board's reasoning as a natural fit for a proposed-combination-does-not-teach-the-claims argument, rather than an unpredictable-results argument.

But after thinking about this decision for a while, I think I see how to map this very same reasoning to the lack-of-predictable-results rationale. You could say that the predictable combination of Hunter and Connell is A, B as a result of A, C' in response to B, and D. But the claims require A, B as a result of A, and C in response to B. So the claim is not a predictable result of the combination, and the Examiner didn't make a prima facie case of obviousness. 

As a side note, you'll recall that the Examiner mentioned the predictable results rationale in the Answer, but also used an explicit motivation to combine from the secondary reference. The Board didn't address this alternative rationale.

Finally, I note that the Applicant also used a hindsight argument during prosecution and in the Appeal Brief, and the Board also found hindsight. Personally, I find hindsight to be a particularly UNhelpful way of viewing obviousness. Hindsight is the conclusion reached when the prima facie case isn't made ... the Examiner must have used hindsight because he hasn't made a prima facie case. Hindsight is not itself a standalone argument against obviousness.

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

BPAI finds "configured to be housed within or detached from the bay" requires both configurations, despite use "or"

Takeaway: In an application directed to a replacement battery pack for an electronic device, the issue on appeal was the phrase "a replacement battery pack configured to be housed within or detached from the battery pack receiving bay" (emphasis added.) The Examiner took the position that since the claim used the word "or" in describing the battery pack configuration, only one of the configurations was required to be found in the prior art. The Applicant argued that the proper interpretation of the claim required both configurations. In particular, the Applicant argued that the phrase "detached from" implied that the battery pack was previously "housed within," and thus the claim required both configurations. The Board found the Examiner's claim interpretation to be unreasonably broad in view of Applicant's specification, which made it clear that "the claim term ““or”” [was used] to mean that the replacement battery pack is configured to provide some functionality, both when the battery pack is disposed in the bay as well as when it is detached from the bay." (Ex parte Godovich, BPAI 2010.) Details:

Ex parte Godovich
Appeal 2009004289; Appl. No.. 11/139,851; Tech. Center 2800
Decided:  November 15, 2010

The application on appeal disclosed a replacement battery pack for an electronic device (below).
A representative claim on appeal read:

     10. A portable electronic device comprising:
     a main body;
     a battery pack for supplying power to the portable electronic device;
     a battery pack receiving bay (120) formed in the main body for removably-housing the battery pack,
     the battery pack receiving bay (120) having a connector electrically connectable to the battery pack; and
     a replacement battery pack (200) configured to be housed within or detached from the battery pack receiving bay,
     the replacement battery pack comprising
          a power storage section having a secondary battery,
          a power input section having at least one power connector for receiving electric power for charging the secondary battery, and
          a power output section having an output terminal for receiving electric power from the power input section and for electrical connection to the connector of the battery pack receiving bay when the replacement battery pack is housed in the battery pack receiving bay to power the portable electronic device.
(Emphasis and reference numbers added.)

Claim 10 was rejected as obvious over Applicant's Admitted Prior Art and a patent reference, Shoji. The rejection relied on AAPA for teaching the main body, battery pack and receiving bay, and on Shoji for teaching the claimed replacement battery pack. The rationale supplied for combining the references was substitution of AAPA's battery with Shoji's battery "in order to use the battery for a variety of applications with high power capacity."

With respect to the "configured to" clause of the replacement battery pack, the Final Office Action alleged that "Shoji discloses a replacement battery pack (A) configured to be housed within or detached from the battery pack receiving bay (mounted or inserted in Second bay)." In a Response to Final, the Applicant argued that the Shoji's auxiliary battery A was not configured as recited in the claim. The Applicant explained that, rather than being "configured to be housed within or detached from the bay," "[Shoji's] auxiliary battery A is an external battery which is connected to the electronic device externally via a connection cable between the power output section 3 and the electronic device." The Applicant also argued the "output terminal" element of the replacement battery pack.

The Advisory Action noted only that "the teaching and elements are both shown in the prior office communication, and the arguments presented by the applicant are not persuasive." The Applicant filed a Pre-Apeal Brief Request, then an Appeal Brief, each of which repeated the same arguments for claim 10.

The Examiner provided new information in the Examiner's Answer. Specifically, the Answer explained (for the first time) that "the claim recites, '– housed within or detached from –' so examiner is required to show one of the two not both" (emphasis added). The Answer then explained that Shoji disclosed one of the limitations – "detached from the [bay]" – by disclosing a power supply cable between the auxiliary battery and the electronic device, such that the "auxiliary battery is detached from the battery pack-receiving bay when the power supply cable is disconnected."

The Applicant filed a Reply Brief to challenge the Examiner's claim interpretation:
[A]ppellant respectfully disagrees with the Examiner's interpretation of the alternative expression in lines 9-10 of claim 10. The second part of the alternative expression in claim 10 explicitly recites that the replacement battery pack is configured to be "detached from the battery pack receiving bay." The term "detached" in claim 10 relates to the replacement battery back being "removed" or "taken out of" the battery pack receiving bay. This is the context in which the term"detached" should be read because the recitation "detached from the battery pack receiving bay" is prefaced by "housed within or", which corresponds to the part of the alternative expression in which the replacement battery pack is housed within (i.e., inserted into) the battery pack receiving bay. Stated otherwise, the expression "detached from the battery pack receiving bay" in claim 10 corresponds to the part of the alternative expression in which the replacement battery pack is removed or taken out from the battery pack receiving bay from the configuration in which the replacement battery pack is "housed within" the battery pack receiving bay, as recited in claim 10.
(Emphasis added.)
The Board agreed with the Applicant, finding the Examiner's interpretation to be unreasonable in view of the specification:
     The Examiner does not find that the cited art teaches both configurations. Rather, the Examiner takes the position that because these noted claims employ the word ““or,”” the cited prior art only needs to disclose a replacement battery pack that possess one of the recited configurations –– not both.
     We find the Examiner’’s interpretation to be unreasonably broad. Read in light of the Specification, it is more than reasonably clear that Appellant used the claim term ““or”” to mean that the replacement battery pack is configured to provide some functionality, both when the battery pack is disposed in the bay as well as when it is detached from the bay.
Based on this unreasonable claim construction, the Board reversed the obviousness rejection of claim 10.

My two cents: The board got this one right. Sometimes OR means AND. That is, while OR can be used to signal a list of alternatives, sometimes OR requires the presence of all the alternatives. In my mind, that's usually the case with "configured to X, Y, or Z." That was definitely the case here. Here's the only description in the spec relating to detaching the battery pack from the receiving bay.
[0051] The structure and function of the connector 116 of the replacement battery pack 100 are the same as for a conventional battery pack used for portable computers. When the replacement battery pack 100 is housed in the battery pack receiving bay 120 of the portable computer 105, the connector 116 is electrically connected to a connector provided in the battery pack receiving bay 120 to form appropriate electrical connection and functions as an output terminal for providing power to the portable computer 105. When the replacement battery pack 100 is detached from the battery pack receiving bay 120 of the portable computer 105, the connector 116 of the replacement battery pack 100 can be electrically connected to corresponding connectors of a charging station and functions as an input terminal for charging the replacement battery pack in a conventionally known manner.
The spec clearly describes two configurations and in no way suggests that either is optional.

The Board focused on the narrow issue of interpreting "configured to X or Y". The Board reversed because the claim required both X and Y and the Examiner found only Y ("detached from").

However, the claim language went further that that, since it also included this specific recitation:
the replacement battery pack comprising ... a power output section having an output terminal for ... electrical connection to the connector of the battery pack receiving bay when the replacement battery pack is housed in the battery pack receiving bay 

The Applicant should have argued this particular point, since the Examiner did not allege that Shoji taught a replacement pack housed in the bay.

I note that the claim uses "for" ("an output terminal ... for electrical connection"). Some Examiners like to ignore any phrase following "for" as intended use. Some Examiners treat "when" the same way. It's best to find this out early in prosecution so you can either amend so that the Examiner gives the phrases patentable weight, or persuasively argue why the language is not intended use.

Finally, though I do think the Board was right to reverse, the Applicant might have been better off amending during prosecution so that the claims used AND rather than OR. Seems like the claim could easily have been structured to recite something like "a first configuration AND a second configuration."

Related posts:

Careful when using OR in a claim to modes
In a claim to "A" or "B", is B always optional

Tuesday, October 9, 2012

Does the BPAI require a definition from the time of filing?


If you read this blog regularly, you'll know that claim construction is often the dispositive issue on appeal. Claim construction arguments are, in the end, arguments about the meaning of claim terms. I've posted several times about using dictionary definitions to make persuasive arguments about the meaning of a claim term. (See this list of posts tagged with "definition"). But what source should you use for a definition? And since claim terms are to be interpreted according to meaning at the time of filing, do you need to show a date for the definition?

Today's post will address the second question. I plan to cover the first question in a later post. (In the mean time, check out the post "What does the BPAI think of Wikipedia definitions?" at the Florida Patent Lawyer blog.)

The Board has on several occasions refused to consider a definition that is undated. For example:

[The Applicant's] citation lacks a date to ensure that it reflects knowledge as of the time of their invention.
Ex parte Hyland, BPAI 2011.

However, both the Examiner and Appellants failed to provide corresponding dates indicating that such definitions come from dictionaries that precede the effective filing data of the present patent application. We therefore decline to adopt the respective dictionary definitions offered by the Examiner and Appellants.
Ex parte Raith, BPAI 2012. See also Ex parte Hicks, BPAI 2011 and Ex parte Moran, BPAI 2011.

Though I don't know of a case in which the Applicant provided a dated definition that postdated the Applicant's filing date, I suspect the Board would refuse to consider such a definition for the same reason.

The Board often introduces a definition of its own when the parties do not. When doing so, the BPAI is inconsistent about whether its definitions have dates before Applicant's filing date. See Ex parte Beer (dictionary dated 1971); Ex parte Raith (dictionary dated 2000); Ex parte Schmitz (dictionary dated 1996); Ex parte Reiter (citation with copyright 2012); and Ex parte Gerards (citation to online dictionary "visited Apr. 21, 2012").

Does the meaning of claim terms change so rapidly that we really need to introduce dated definitions? Would it make more sense to presume that a definition reflects the meaning at the relevant date, and let either side rebut the presumption?

The Board recently took this approach in the reexamination appeal Nike v Adidas (PTAB 2012). In the Nike reexam, the parties argued over the meaning of "inflection." In deciding the issue, the Board introduced a dictionary definition of this word. However, instead of noting the date of the definition, the Board instead applied a presumption about the date:
The definitions of general terms cited herein are believed to accurately reflect the meanings of those terms as of the effective filing date(s) of the rejected claims.

I think this approach makes sense during prosecution. After all, most applications and even issued patents are appealed within 10 years of the time of filing, and I doubt that many dictionary definitions change much in that period. So this seems like a reasonable presumption.

I wonder if this presumption is available to Applicants? Maybe. But don't rely on this. Instead, you should provide the date of any definition you rely on. And better yet, provide some evidence of this date rather than a mere assertion.