Board finds no inconsistency with relying on Official Notice for a claimed feature while also asserting that this feature isn't supported by Applicant's sparse description

Takeaway: The Examiner denied the Applicant's priority claim to a provisional, for failure to adequately describe a claim limitation. According to the Examiner, some description was present, but not in the context claimed. The Examiner then used Official Notice for this same feature in an obviousness rejection. On appeal, the Applicant argued the "facial inconsistency" of these two positions: "asserting the feature was unquestionably and notoriously known in the prior art (which was silent about the feature), while contending that the applicant's provisional application, which provided textual support for the feature, nevertheless was not sufficient to establish a priority for the feature." The Board was not persuaded by the inconsistency argument, and cited to Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar to explain that "a claimed feature that is common knowledge in the art must nevertheless have adequate written description support in the specification to demonstrate to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventors had possession of the claimed invention at the time of the filing of the application." (Ex parte Timbadia, PTAB 2013.)

Details:
Ex parte Timbadia
Appeal 2010002877; Appl. No. 10/712,938; Tech. Center 3700
Decided: March 25, 2013

The application was directed to automated test-taking. During prosecution, the Applicant amended to add these limitations:

     delivering a changed state object at the same time that a triggering event occurs on the testing station;
     upon failure of the testing station, the [state objects] ... are used to recreate the examination on the testing station ... and
     wherein the user will not be penalized for the time that questions are not available.
(Emphasis added for limitations at issue.)

In response, the Examiner switched to a different secondary reference in the obviousness rejection (Ashley)of all independent claims. The Examiner relied on this secondary reference for the "at the same time" feature, and took Official Notice of the new "not penalized" feature. At the same time, the Examiner denied the priority claim because the newly added "at the same time" and "not penalized" features were allegedly not present in the provisional. However, Examiner did not reject any claims under written description or enablement.

In an After Final response, the Applicant argued that the Ashley reference was not prior art because the Applicant's provisional did provide an enabling disclosure for the newly claimed features. In support of this argument, the Applicant pointed to to specific passages in the provisional and explained their relevance. The Applicant also traversed the Official Notice as follows:

Applicants cannot fail to note that this portion of the claims so evidently and precisely enabled by the provisional application is also the same portion of the claims for which the Examiner has relied upon official notice. Per MPEP 2144.03, Applicants thus traverse such taking of official notice as improper as lacking sufficient documentary evidence. Citation of a post-dated alleged prior art reference by the Examiner is erroneous not only for the obviousness rejection presented, but also as grounds for taking official notice that the claimed feature is of such notorious character as capable of instant and unquestionable demonstration as to defy dispute. See In re Zurko, 258 F.3d at 1386.

The Applicant appealed. In the Brief, the Applicant specifically traversed the issue of the priority claim. The Applicant explained that the provisional application described using a test state to recover an exam after testing station failure, and this test state includes an elapsed test time that takes into consideration the amount of time that a test is unavailable to the user. Thus, Ashley was not prior art. In the obviousness section of the Brief, the Applicant also argued that Ashley did not teach the "at the same time" limitation. Notably, this section did not discuss the "not penalized" claim limitation or the Examiner's reliance of Official Notice for this feature.

In the Answer, the Examiner maintained the obviousness rejection of all independent claims. The Examiner discussed the denial of priority in the obviousness rejection. The Examiner acknowledged that the "not penalized" claim language was present in the provisional, but noted this was in the context of accounting for transmission latency rather than in the context of a recovery function (as claimed). In a Response to Arguments section, the Examiner noted there were "significant modifications" and "stark differences" between the provisional and the application on appeal. Also, the Applicant had failed to adequately traverse the Official Notice during prosecution, thus admitting that the "not penalized" feature was well-known.

The Applicant filed a Reply Brief which included a section titled "the Examiner's use of Official Notice was properly traversed, is improper and is Squarely Inconsistent with the Office's Contention that Subject Matter at Issue is Not Supported by Applicants'Own Provisional Application." The Applicant argued that the traversal was proper, as follows:

[T]he traversal highlighted the facial inconsistency in the examiner's logic of asserting that the feature was unquestionably and notoriously known in the prior art (which was silent about the feature), while contending that the applicant's provisional application, which provided textual support for the feature, nevertheless was not sufficient to establish a priority for the feature.

On appeal, the Board made findings with regard to "Claims 1 and 13 – Written Description Support" since this issue was contested and impacted the obviousness rejection. The Board found that all features recited in claims 1 and 13 were adequately described in the provisional, so that Ashley was not prior art. With regard to the "not penalized feature," the Board found that the Examiner’s interpretation of what the provisional application describes was "unreasonably narrow." The Examiner incorrectly focused on the provisional's teachings about accounting for transmission latency, but a person of ordinary skill reading the document as a whole "would conclude that recreating the test based on the state of the test at the time of a testing station failure would require not penalizing the user for time lost due to this failure."

Since Ashely was not prior art for claims 1 and 13, the Board reversed the obviousness rejection of these claims. However, claim 20 used slightly different language to describe the "initial state object" feature, which the Board found was not adequately described in the provisional. The Board therefore considered the obviousness rejection of claim 20 on the merits, and affirmed.

With regard to the "at the same time" feature, the Board found no error in the Examiner's finding that Kershaw taught this feature. With regard to the "not penalized" feature, the Board found that the Applicant had not properly traversed the taking of Official Notice because it did not "explain why the noticed fact is not considered to be common knowledge or well-known in the art" (citing In re Boon, 439 F.2d 724, 728 (CCPA 1971)).

The Board also commented on the Applicant's inconsistency argument – that the Notice'd feature was completely missing in the reference yet textually supported by Applicant's provisional:

Appellants have not provided persuasive argument as to why the Examiner’s findings are inconsistent. A claimed feature that is common knowledge in the art must nevertheless have adequate written description support in the specification to demonstrate to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventors had possession of the claimed invention at the time of the filing of the application. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

Finally, the Board noted that any alleged inconsistency was resolved by the Board's finding that the subject of the Official Notice ("not penalized" feature) was indeed properly supported in the provisional application.


My two cents: The Applicant's inconsistency argument has intuitive appeal, but is ultimately flawed. The argument goes like this: "Surely the Examiner's characterization of a feature as 'well-known' indicates that very little description is needed, in which case a sparse description of the same feature by the Applicant shouldn't result in a denial of the priority claim." However, this argument is flawed because it confuses enablement and written description.

A reference has only to enable. Since this can take into account the background knowledge of a POSITA, a sparse description may indeed be enough for enablement. On the other hand, the Applicant's spec has to comply with both the enablement and the written description requirement. And written description "must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed." (Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2010) (en banc)).

Unfortunately, when you have a sparse description of a particular embodiment that falls within the claim scope, then try to argue that a POSITA can fill in the rest, the case law on written description goes against you:

The question is not whether a claimed invention is an obvious variant of that which is disclosed in the specification. Rather, a prior application itself must describe an invention, and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought.
Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. 3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Or, put another way:

A description of one method . . . does not entitle the inventor . . . to claim any and all means for achieving that objective."
LizardTech v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

In re Giacomini: Federal Circuit confirms use of provisional filing date as priority date

Takeaway: In a case of statutory construction of § 102(e), the Federal Circuit confirmed the long standing PTO practice of using the provisional filing date as the effective filing date of a US patent or patent publication claiming priority to that provisional. See In re Giacomini (CAFC 2009-1400). This decision also confirms that to obtain this priority date, the patent or patent publication must provide written description support under § 112 First, though that wasn't at issue in this particular case.

My two cents: Nothing new here. This has been PTO practice for years (see MPEP 2163.04), and the BPAI upheld the PTO practice in Ex parte Yamaguchi, a precedential decision from a couple of years ago. But apparently this is the first time the Federal Circuit has actually addressed the issue.

Related posts: I also blogged here and here about Giacomini and the 102(e) issue. Giacomini at the BPAI also involved an interesting indefiniteness issue, which I blogged about here.

Fed. Cir. appeal on use of provisional date as priority date (In re Giacomini)

Last year, the BPAI issued the precedential opinion Ex parte Yamaguchi, which held that a reference is available as 102(e) prior art as of the filing date of its provisional application, as long as the provisional "supports" the subject matter used in the rejection.

I didn't even blink when I read this decision, since I see Examiners do this all the time and the MPEP specifically allows for this (see MPEP 2163.03). My impression of Yamaguchi was that the Applicant didn't understand the burden of proof: the Applicant argued that the provisional "didn't exactly track" the reference patent publication, and the Board considered this to be a conclusory statement which wasn't enough to rebut the Examiner's finding that the "provisional application 'clearly shows the same subject matter as applied from the [reference]'."

Now this issue – reaching back to the provisional filing date – is coming before the Federal Circuit in the case In re Giacomini (Fed. Cir. docket no. 2009-1400). I was surprised to learn this is the first time the Federal Circuit has considered the issue. True, the relevant language in § 102(e) is relatively recent: the 1999 "American Inventors Protection Act". But no one in the last 10 years had an infringement case or a BPAI case that hinged on a reference's provisional date that was important enough to appeal?

In re Giacomini is scheduled for oral argument in January 2010, and the briefs are available through PatentlyO (here).

Though I glanced at the briefs, I'm not interested enough in statutory construction to form an opinion on which side has the better argument. I am interested in patent prosecution, though, and found a few things in the file history that I'll comment on in a later post.

Follow up / Related Posts:

• I blogged about the eventual Federal Circuit decision In re Giacomini here; 
• I blogged about why the Applicant didn't even argue that the reference didn't deserve the provisional's filing date here.
• I blogged about Giacomini's indefiniteness issue at the BPAI here.

Claims implied by specification not enough for 112 First (Ex parte Abdel-Hafez:)

Ex parte Abdel-Hafez
Decided March 30, 2009
(Appeal 2002-3826; Appl. No. 10/691,696; Tech. Center 2100)

I view this case as a warning to avoid the word "implied" in your arguments against a § 112 rejection. The Applicant argued that a claim element was "implied" by the disclosure, and Board read "implied" as "renders obvious":

... the question of written description support should not be confused with the question of what would have been obvious to the artisan ... Whether Appellant's proffered provisional application support "implies" and thus renders obvious the later claimed "global" limitations is not relevant to the inquiry before us.
(Decision, p. 10.)

I think the Board was confused about written description vs. obviousness, since I do not read the Applicant's argument (a claim element was implied by the disclosure) as an argument that the claim element was obvious in view of the disclosure. Instead, I view the Applicant's argument as a reliance on the implicit teachings of the specification. And there's nothing wrong with that: an Applicant is entitled to rely not only on the explicit teachings of the specification, but also on the implicit teachings, since the specification is viewed not from the standpoint of a layman, but from the standpoint of a person of ordinary skill in the art.

 Although [the applicant] does not have to describe exactly the subject matter claimed, ... the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [he or she] invented what is claimed.... The test for sufficiency of support in a parent application is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to the artisan that the inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed subject matter. 46 Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563, 19 USPQ2d 1111, 1116 (Fed.Cir. 1991).

Okay, sometimes there's a fine line between saying that something not explicitly described in the spec is rendered obvious by the spec, and saying that something not explicitly described is implicitly disclosed. But the line exists, and I don't understand why the Board thought the Applicant crossed this line. After all, the Applicant said the claim element was "implied" by the spec, not that the element was "obvious" in view of the spec.

It's not clear whether the Board relied on this finding alone to uphold the §112 rejection, since the Board went on to indicate that "Appellants have not provided any meaningful analysis explaining how the pertinent portions of the provisional application meet the written description and enablement requirements under §112, first paragraph."(Decision, p. 10.)

It's true that the Applicant here did nothing more than point to two paragraphs of the provisional and make this statement:

While the word "global" is not used, taken with the provisional drawings, these all imply that the scan-enable SE signals and the set-reset enable SR_EN signals are global in nature in that provisional application.
(Brief, p. 11.)

So another takeway from this case could be: if you're relying on implicit rather than explicit disclosure, explain your reasoning. In this particular case, the argument might go something like this:

The provisional application discloses: “[t]he present invention uses A scan enable (SE) and and/or gate to disable the asynchronous set/reset signals of ALL scan cells. A new set/reset enable (SR_EN) signal is introduced to propagate the faults of asynchronous set/reset signals in a dedicated capture cycle.” (Capitalization and italics added for emphasis.) Although the provisional uses the article A rather than the adjective ONE, when used in ordinary English and outside of a claim, “A scan enable” is understood to mean “ONE scan enable.” Thus, the provisional discloses that one scan enable disables set/reset for all scan cells. Since "global" means "of, relating to, or applying to a whole," ONE signal that disables something for ALL scan cells is understood to be a “GLOBAL scan enable signal,” as is recited in claim 83. Thus, the provisional does “convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, [the inventor] was in possession of the invention.” Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The written description rejection of claim 83 should therefore be overturned.

I won't say that Ex parte Abdel-Hafez holds “using 'implied' in reference to the disclosure is inapplicable to a § 112 argument” — that would go too far. However, I do think this case shows that if you rely on implicit disclosure, you should explain the inferences that a POSITA draws from the disclosure.