Board says claim term, as defined in the specification, reads on the reference

Takeaway: The Applicant appealed claims to a meat processing system. The claim included the limitation "a wash station where at least one antimicrobial agent is applied to a hide." The Examiner relied on a reference that disclosed water applied to a carcass, and the Applicant presented evidence that a POSITA would not consider water to be an antimicrobial at the temperature disclosed in the reference. The Examiner noted that the claim did not recite a temperature, and that the Applicant's specification disclosed lower water temperatures and was thus was inconsistent with the evidence. The Board affirmed the rejection, finding that "[Applicant's] Specification expressly defines an antimicrobial agent as encompassing the washing steps disclosed by Norrie, even at temperatures that would not kill the microorganism." (Ex parte Osborne, PTAB 2012.)

Details: Ex parte Osborne
Appeal 2011011685; Appl. No. 11/084,785; Tech. Center 3600
Decided  Aug. 28, 2012

A representative claim on appeal read:

35. A meat processing system comprising a series of stations in order:
     A first station for stunning an animal;
     A second station for exsanguinating the animal;
     A third station that is a wash station where at least one antimicrobial agent is applied to a hide of a hide-on animal carcass; and
     A fourth station that is a hide removal area configured to at least partially remove at least a portion of the hide from the hide-on animal carcass,
     wherein a conveyor system transports the hide-on animal carcass through at least the third and fourth stations.

The dispositive issue for the independent claims on appeal was the meaning of the term "antimicrobial agent."

The Examiner rejected system claim 35 as obvious over Lawler, Norrie, and Simon, relying on Norrie for teaching the "antimicrobial agent is applied ..." limitation. During prosecution, the Applicant argued that Norrie disclosed the application of high temperature water to soften the hair of the carcass. The Examiner explained in an Advisory Action that Norrie's high temperature water was considered antimicrobial because Applicant's specification taught "the use of water by itself as an antimicrobial agent and therefore the high temperature water of Norrie can be construed as an antimicrobial agent."

The Applicant appealed, and in the Appeal Brief introduced evidence to show that Norrie's high temperature water was not an antimicrobial agent:

Norrie's water temperature is not sufficient to act as antimicrobial in the context of the present invention. Norrie provides that the [applied water] may be in temperature zones of 45-60, 55-65 and 50-60 degrees C. This temperature is not high enough to provide antimicrobial action. See, for example, the Williams reference [Appendix XI], which provides evidence that when water is used as an antimicrobial intervention, the temperature of the water is 165 degrees F, 73 degrees C.

The Examiner replied to this argument in the Answer by noting that "Appellant's arguments are not consistent with the antimicrobial agents detailed in Appellant's specification," since the specification listed "water by itself." The Answer then commented on the Williams reference offered as evidence by the Applicant

[T]his Williams et al. evidence does not state the temperature of the water is critical in view of other water temperatures and as seen in para. 0054 of Applicant's specification, the water temperature detailed by Applicant is between 100-190 degree F and therefore the Williams evidence is not consistent with Applicant's disclosure and it is noted that the temperature of the water is not found on any of the claims on appeal.

The Board affirmed the rejection. The Board first looked to the following sentences in Applicant's Specification:

The antimicrobial agent may be any chemical or substance capable of killing, neutralizing, or removing microorganisms. In one embodiment, the antimicrobial agent is water or some combination of water and at least one other antimicrobial agent.
(Finding of Fact 1, emphasis in PTAB opinion.)

Based on this finding, the Board went on to find that "antimicrobial agent" encompassed water at the temperatures taught in Norrie. The Board explained its claim construction as follows:

The Specification defines an antimicrobial agent to be any “chemical or substance capable of killing, neutralizing or removing microorganisms.” (FF1.) The Specification further discloses that water is an antimicrobial agent. (FF1.) Thus, the limitation of ‘at least one antimicrobial agent” is interpreted to include water. The limitation of “a wash station where at least one antimicrobial agent is applied to the hide of a hide on animal,” as recited in claim 35, is interpreted to encompass applying water to the hide of an animal. ... As noted by the Examiner, Norrie uses water in the washing steps, and water is encompassed by the definition of an antimicrobial agent as provided in the Specification. (FFs 1, 2, 4.)

The Board explained that this definition trumped the evidence offered by the Applicant to that show water did not in fact act as an antimicrobial at the temperatures used in Norrie:

[Applicant's] Specification expressly defines an antimicrobial agent as encompassing the washing steps disclosed by Norrie, even at temperatures that would not kill the microorganism. See Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1997)(“The inventors’ definition and explanation of the meaning of the word … as evidenced by the specification, controls the interpretation of that claim term).

My two cents: I had a lot of trouble understanding the Board's opinion. It's clear to me that the Board relied on a definition of antimicrobial agent in the Applicant's spec. ("[Applicant] expressly defines an antimicrobial agent as encompassing the washing steps disclosed by Norrie, even at temperatures that would not kill the microorganism.") But how does the Board get from antimicrobial-means-killing-neutralizing-or-removing to water-is-an-antimicrobial-even-at-temperatures-that-don't-kill?

I do read the Specification statement "antimicrobial agent may be any chemical or substance capable of ..." as a definition of microbial agent. As such, the Applicant is bound by this definition, even it's different than what a POSITA would understand. But the Board went further, saying that the Applicant had defined antimicrobial in such a way that temperature was irrelevant. How so?

Surely the question of what chemicals or substances meet the kills-neutralizes-or-removing definition, is one of fact. Does water kill microorganisms at any temperature? This is not my area of expertise, but I think I know enough about science to say No.

In the Answer, the Examiner noted that "the temperature of the water is not found on any of the claims on appeal." This is a red herring, because the claim didn't say "water is applied to the hide". If it did, then sure, any teaching of applying water would anticipate the element, regardless of temperature. But since the claim instead said "antimicrobial agent is applied to the hide", we have to ask what a POSITA knows about water as an antimicrobial.

The Williams reference submitted by the Applicant said No, that "when water is used as an antimicrobial intervention, the temperature is 165° F." Whereas Norrie disclosed applying water at temperatures of 113-149° F.

The Examiner countered this argument by pointing to additional statements in the Spec:

[0054] The heater 108 may heat the wash solution to a temperature ranging from about 100 to about 190 degrees Fahrenheit. In a further embodiment, the heater 108 may heat the wash solution to a temperature ranging from about 140 to about 150 degrees Fahrenheit. Alternatively, the heater 108 heats the wash solution to another temperature known to kill microbes.

According to the Examiner, these statements showed that "the Williams evidence is not consistent with Applicant's disclosure." Wrong. Let's assume for the sake of argument that if the Applicant misstates a technical fact, he's bound by it. So if the Spec really did say that water has an antimicrobial effect at 100° F, then the reference anticipates.

But wait ... the Spec didn't say that. The Spec disclosed various embodiments that heat water to different temperatures. Not an admission that water is antimicrobial at these temperatures. In fact, you could argue that the last sentence ("Alternatively ... to another temperature known to kill microbes") means that water does not kill microbes at the other listed temperatures.

So I say the Examiner is wrong, and the rejection is in error.

However, I suspect that the Board affirmed the rejection based on entirely different reasoning -- and did a terrible job of explaining this. I'll discuss this in my next post.

Color Drawing Petitions, Part II

My last post (When are color drawings acceptable? ) discussed a few Decisions on Color Drawing Petitions. Today I'll discuss a few more.

13/143,209 - Color Drawings Petition DENIED: In Jul. 2011, the Applicant filed a Petition for Color Drawings in 13/143, 209 ("Electromagnetic Radiation Mapping System"). The Petition stated:

Applicant asserts that the color found in the attached Figures is significant to the understanding of the invention. The necessity for the Color Drawings is to clearly show the maps and graphs of the figures.

In Mar. 2012, before an Art Unit was assigned, the Petition was Decided by a Petitions Examiner in the Office of Petitions. The Petition was denied, and the decision summarily stated that "the Office has determined that color drawings and photographs are not necessary for an understanding of the invention."

13/031,293 - Color Drawings Petition DENIED: In Feb. 2011, the Applicant for 13/031,293 ("Method and System for Detecting Light") filed the application and a Color Drawings Petition.The petition included the following explanation:

Applicant asserts that the color found in the attached Figures is significant to the understanding of the invention. The necessity for the Color Drawings is to distinguish the different lines.

In Mar. 2012, after being assigned to an Art Unit (1735) but before being docketed to an Examiner, a Petitions Attorney in the Office of Petitions denied the petition. The Decision explained as follows:

The Office has determined that color drawings or photographs are not the only practical medium by which to disclose in a printed utility patent the subject matter to be patented. As such, color drawings or photographs are not necessary for an understanding of the invention sought to be patented.

13/200,784 - Color Drawings Petition GRANTED: In Aug. 2007, the Applicant filed application 13/200,784 ("Method And System For Dynamic, Three-dimensional Geological Interpretation And Modeling"). The specification described one of the drawings, FIG. 16, as "exhibit[ing] integrating stratigraphic erosional rules into the present geological interpretation system."

The Applicant filed a Petition for Color Drawings two years later, though before the application was docketed to an Examiner. The Petition stated:

Applicant believes the detail contained within the drawings cannot be fully captured using black and white drawings ... The present disclosure allows the analyzing and interpreting of geological information associated with a geologic region [and] creation of three-dimensional graphic displays [of the information]. Accordingly, the color figures support properly conveying the form of the graphical displays.

At Notice of Allowance, the Petition was undecided. After the issue fee was paid, the Petition was granted by a Quality Control Specialist in the Publications Branch. The Decision indicated that "the petition was accompanied by all of the required fees and drawings" and "the specification contains the appropriate language."

13/200,784 - Color Drawings Petition GRANTED: The Applicant for 13/200,784 ("Interferometric Modulation Devices Having Triangular Subpixels") filed the application and a Color Drawings Petition in Sep. 2011. The petition included the following explanation:

The color drawings are believed to be the most practical method (and may be the only practical method) of accurately illustrating the different subpixel colors, groupings of subpixel colors, etc. Some of these drawings (Figs. 11A through 11C) not only depict different subpixel colors and groupings of subpixel layers, but also depict different groupings of subpixel colors underneath an "M1" layer.

In Feb. 2012, after being assigned to an Art Unit (2873) but before being docketed to an Examiner, a Senior Petitions Attorney in the Office of Petitions granted the petition. The Decision did not comment on the Applicant's explanation, but noted that the petition was accompanied "by all of the required fees and drawings" and that the specification included "the appropriate language."

My two cents: I'm not surprised to see Applicants filing Color Petitions for graphs and charts. The use of color can certainly make complicated graphs and charts easier to understand. However, color isn't the only way to convey that information. For example, I've seen black and white charts that use different types of dashed lines for different data series, or Xs and Os for the data points, etc.

Maybe this was the reason why the Petition in the first and second xamples above were denied. Hard to say, as no explanation was given.

The third example would be a little harder to do in black and white, but you could still use different types of fill instead of color. I think the last example comes closest to "only practical medium" standard set out in the CFR. Yes, you could distinguish the subpixels with different type of fill. But this particular drawing has a lot of different regions close together, so that would probably be a mess. So, color makes sense.

However, as I read the Petition Decision on this subpixels application, the Petition wasn't really granted on the merits. That is, the Petition doesn't say "the Office has determined that color is necessary." It just says the Applicant checked all the right boxes.

These eight Color Drawing Petition Decisions (this post and the last) are such a tiny sample size that it's hard to draw any real conclusions about what it takes to get Color Drawings accepted. That said, I wonder if one factor is the branch of the PTO that looks at the Petition. A Petitions Examiner looked at 3 of these 8 Petitions, and 2 of those 3 were denied. And the single one granted by a Petitions Examiner was the drawing with the most persuasive reason for color. In contrast, all 5 of the Petitions processed by something other than the Petitions Office were granted with virtually no explanation.

When are color drawings acceptable? A review of some Petition Decisions

The patent rules in 37 CFR §1.84 provide for color drawings "on rare occasions" when "necessary as the only practical medium by which to disclose the subject matter sought to be patented." I've always wondered how the PTO interprets this requirement. The answer isn't readily available, since color drawings require a petition, and there is no database of petition decisions equivalent to the database of Board of Appeals decisions. But I do run across Color Drawing Petitions from time to time, so in today's post I'll discuss an admittedly very small and random subset of decisions on Color Drawings Petitions. Later I'll follow up with another post discussing a few more of these decisions. 

 11/925,065 - Color Drawings Petition GRANTED Jun. 2010: The Applicant for 11/925,065 filed an application with a petition to accept 3 of the 6 drawings in color. The application was titled "Transmitting Information Effectively in Server/Client Network". The black & white version of one of the color drawings, from from the patent publication, is shown below:

As an explanation for why color was necessary, the Applicant stated:

...the use of color drawings is necessary to differentiate the information and the direction of travel of the information in the server/client network. The use of color drawings for these features of the present invention is considered essential.

After being assigned to an Art Unit, but before examination began, a Quality Assurance Specialist in T.C. 2400 granted the petition. The Decision did not comment on the sufficiency of the Applicant's explanation,  noting only that conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of §1.84(a)(2) were met.

12/288,158 - Color Drawings Petition GRANTED Aug. 2010: The Applicant for 12/288,158 filed an application ("NLP-Based Entity Recognition and Disambiguation") with a petition to accept several user interface screen shots as color drawings. The black & white version of one of these drawings, from the patent publication, is shown below:

The petition did not include any explanation for why color was necessary. A few months after the Petition was filed, a Quality Assurance Specialist in TC 2100 denied the petition for this reason. The Applicant filed another Petition, and this time explained that "the color drawings are necessary to particularly point out and support Applicants' claimed invention." The same Q.A. Specialist granted the second petition, noting only the petition did contain the explanation required by §1.84.

11/495,229 - Color Drawings Petition Granted Jun. 2007: The Applicant for 11/495,229 filed an application ("Interactive Computer Simulation Enhanced Exercise Machine") with a petition to accept color photographs. The black & white version of one of these photographs, from the patent publication, is shown below:

As an explanation for why color was necessary, the Petition stated:

Color drawings are the only practical medium by which to disclose the simulated environment developed and generated by the disclosed subject matter of to the patent... Such details and contrast between the environment objects are only provided in color and would be lacking in a black & white photograph.

Six months after filing, the Petition was granted by a Supervisory Patent Examiner in T.C. 3700. The SPE treated the Petition as one to accept Color Photographs, since it referred to both §1.84(a) and §1.84(b) and included copies of the photographs in both black & white and color. The Decision did not comment on the sufficient of the Applicant's reason for color. Instead, the SPE simply noted that the Applicant had complied with the color photograph requirements of §1.84(b) by submitting the appropriate fee, a statement in the spec referring to color drawings, three sets of color drawings, and "a black and white photocopy accurately depicting, to the extent  possible, the subject matter shown in the color drawing."

13/033,384 - Color Drawings Petition GRANTED Mar. 2011: The Applicant for 13/033,384 filed an application ("Method for Embedding Secret Message into PNG Image") with a petition to accept several drawings in color. The specification described two of the color drawings as showing "an image before a secret message is embedded" and "the same image ... after the secret message is embedded." The black & white version of these drawings, from the patent publication, is shown below:

The Petition explained that "color drawings are believed to be the only practical medium by which to disclose the subject matter sought to be patented." Only a month after the Petition was filed, a Quality Assurance Specialist in T.C. 2400 granted the Petition. The Decision did not comment on the sufficiency of the Applicant's explanation,  noting only that conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of §1.84(a)(2) were met.

My two cents: Seriously? You really think you need color drawings for a block diagram, a run-of-the-mill user interface, and a screen shot of a exercise simulation? The only one of these four for which color seems necessary is the last one, the one illustrating embedding a secret message. Although I can't see any difference in the publication between before and after the embedding, I can imagine that such a difference could only be expressed in color.

But there's no way you need color for the block diagram of the computer network -- the drawing already
uses different dashed lines to distinguish the difference in direction! As for the second example, not only is color not strictly necessary for the user interface, I don't even think it adds anything useful over a line drawing. Finally, the screen shot of the exercise simulation looks terrible, and line drawings would have shown the features much better.

What's the thinking here? Do patent practitioners submit color drawings simply because the drawings provided by the client are in color? Or is the rationale to save money? Note that the petition fee is only $130, and it wouldn't surprise me that a complicated user interface or screen shot would cost more than $130 to prepare as a line drawing. 

I think the PTO should provide some guidance on what is an acceptable reason for color drawings. Is the bar for the "necessary as the only practical medium" requirement of §1.84 really this low?

Board of Appeals discusses §1.132 derivation declaration and rejection under §102(f)

Takeaway: An Applicant attempted to disqualify, as prior art, a publication listing two of the four inventors as authors. In a §1.132 declaration, the four inventors stated that the publication was derived from the work of the two author inventors. The Examiner found the declaration insufficient to overcome the §102(a) rejection because it did not attest to derivation from all of the inventors. The Examiner then added a rejection under §102(f) ("did not invent"). The Applicant appealed, arguing that a derivation declaration was only required to attest to derivation from at least one inventor, and that the §102(f) rejection was in error since the Examiner had not identified an inventor not named on the application. The Board affirmed the §102(a) rejection, holding that the declaration must attest to derivation from the entire inventive entity in order to show the publication was not "by another." However, the Board reversed the §102(f) rejection, finding that the statement in the declaration which referred to "our invention" provided enough evidence of correct inventorship to overcome the rejection.

Details:

Ex parte Abe
Appeal 2010000029; Serial No. 10/128,474; Tech. Center 2400
Decided:  June 28, 2012

The Examiner rejected all claims under §102(a) by a publication ("XPath") authored by two of the four inventors and submitted in an IDS. The Applicant attempted to disqualify the Xpath publication as prior art by filing a derivation declaration under §1.132. The Examiner found the declaration insufficient, since MPEP §716.10 "requires that the relevant portions of the reference originated with or were obtained from applicant (i.e., inventive entity)" (emphasis added). However, the Applicant's declaration merely stated that the reference was derived from the work of only two out of the four inventor.

The Examiner also added a rejection under §102(f) ("did not invent"). The Examiner explained as follows:

Applicant has declared that only two of the four inventors have derived the relevant portions of the [Xpath reference]. Given the reference teaches all the claimed limitations, it is apparent that the inventive entity (Mari Abe, Scott D. Dewitt, Masahiro Hori, and Brad B. Topol) are not the sole inventors of the claimed invention.

In an Appeal Brief, the Applicant continued to argue that the §1.132 declaration had removed Xpath as prior art. The Appeal Brief also specifically addressed various dependent claims, arguing that the Xpath did not teach all the limitations of those claims. In explaining why Xpath had been removed as prior art, the Applicant asserted that a §1.132 declaration disqualified the reference as long as the reference was "derived from at least one Applicant," as opposed to the Examiner's requirement that the derivation be from the work of all inventors. The Applicant explained that the Examiner's reading led to the "anomalous result" that §1.132 declarations could be used when "all possible inventors (as described in the article) may not have been named as inventors" yet could not be used when "all possible inventors (as described in the article) have been named as inventors."

The Applicant turned to the §102(f) rejection. The Applicant first addressed the Examiner's statement implying the inventive entity must be incorrect by noting that inventorship was on record in the executed Declaration and Power of Attorney. According to the Applicant, the §102(f) rejection was in error because the Examiner had not identified any inventor not named on the declaration.

In the Answer, the Examiner handled the §102(a) rejection by simply stating that the declaration did not overcome the rejection. As to §102(f), the Examiner explained:

Example 2 of MPEP 716.10 requires that the relevant portions of the reference originated with or were obtained from applicant (i.e. inventive entity). Applicant has declared that the reference "A Visual Approach to Authoring XPath Expressions" is derived from the work of only two out of the four inventors. Therefore, it raises a question as to whether the inventive entity (i.e. Abe, Hori, Dewitt and Topol) are the sole inventors since the claimed subiect  matter was only derived from Abe and Hori. The Examiner requested it be made clear that Dewitt and Topol did not contribute to the claimed invention (e.g. they only contributed to a portion of the specification that was not claimed) in order to rule out the possibility that the inventive entity are not the sole inventors of the claimed subject matter.

The Applicant filed a Reply Brief noting that the Examiner's Answer amounted to a request to remove inventors, while inventorship is a question of fact and cannot be manipulated for the convenience of the Examiner. Moreover, the Applicant explained, inventorship is determined on a claim by claim basis:

Dewitt and Topol may be inventors of only some of the claims. Similarly, Abe and Hori may be inventors of only some of the claims. The fact that certain claims were not identically disclosed by the prior art article by Abe and Hori evidences that additional contribution was made to the claimed invention.

On appeal, the Board affirmed-in-part. The §102(a) rejection of the independent claims was affirmed, but the §102(f) rejection was reversed. The Board also reversed the §102(a) rejection of some of the dependent claims, finding that various features in dependent claims were not disclosed by the Xpath reference.

The Board clarified that attesting to derivation from a subset of the inventors was sufficient not remove the reference as "by another" under §102(a). "By another" means any difference in inventive entity, so the fact that only two inventors were listed as authors of the Xpath publication indicated that the publication was "by another." A §1.132 declaration attesting to derivation from all the inventors would thus disqualify the reference, by showing that the inventive entity is the same. However, derivation from only a subset of the inventors means the reference is still "by another" and is thus prior art. 

In reversing the §102(f) rejection, the Board explained that designation of the authors of a publication not raise a presumption of inventorship with respect to the subject matter disclosed in the article so as to justify a rejection under §102(f). (MPEP §715.01(c)). Such a rejection does require the Applicant to "provide a satisfactory showing by way of affidavit under 37 CFR 1.132 that the inventorship of the application is correct." (MPEP §715.01(c)). The Board found the Applicant did exactly that, by submitting a declaration signed by all inventor stating "the disclosure found in the [Xpath publication] is our own invention."

My two cents: Reading in between the lines, the Board's brief opinion suggests that the Applicant had simply misinterpreted the law on §1.132 derivation declarations. Yet the Applicant fought long and hard for its position, when it seems that the problem could be taken care of by rewording the declaration. Unless, factually, the Applicant simply couldn't make the statement that the two author inventors derived from the work of the other two (non-author) inventors? The Applicant's arguments suggested that inventorship may have varied from claim to claim. So maybe another approach would be to split the application into two, with different inventive entities? I gotta admit, I got a headache thinking about this one.

Was the Examiner off base in giving the §102(f) rejection? Essentially, the §102(f) rejection seemed to be the result of a discrepancy between Abe, Hori, Dewitt & Topol being named the inventive entity and a finding that a publication authored by Abe & Hori alone disclosed all claim limitations. 

Board reverses 101 "transitory" rejection because specification amendment removed reference to signals

Takeaway: The Patent Trial and Appeals Board reversed a § 101 rejection of a "computer program product tangibly embodied in an information carrier" because the Applicant had amended the specification during prosecution to remove references to signals and carriers. Although recognizing that In re Nuijten required a rejection under § 101 "when the broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim covers a signal per se," the Board determined that the broadest reasonable interpretation should take into account the specification amendment that removed the reference to signals and carriers.

Details:
Ex parte Pyka
Appeal 2010005667; Appl. 11/025,686; Tech. Center 2100
Decided:  Dec. 31, 2012

The application on appeal was directed to computer searching using global agreed-upon data structures. A representative claim on appeal read:

     14. A computer program product tangibly embodied in an information carrier, the computer program product comprising instructions that, when executed, cause at least one processor to perform operations comprising:
...
     wherein the request broker is configured to receive the search request and to transmit the search request to one or more non-local servers for execution of the search request; and
     wherein the standardized data structure is a globally agreed-upon data structure.
(Emphasis added.)

During prosecution, the Examiner rejected claim 14 under § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. Based on a particular paragraph in the specification, the Examiner noted that "Appellant intends the information carrier to include signals as such the claim is drawn to a form of energy." However, the Examiner further noted that "energy is not one of the four categories of invention."

In response, the Applicant amended the specification to delete the sentence upon which the § 101 rejection was based: "Optionally, further carriers and further signals embody computer program products (CPP) to be executed by further processors in computer 901 and 902." In the Remarks section, the Applicant stated that the amendment overcame the rejection "by narrowing the scope of the claim to statutory subject matter."

In a Final Office Action, the Examiner maintained the § 101 rejection and added an objection to the specification, alleging that the amendment by deletion introduced new matter.

The Applicant appealed the § 101 rejection and various prior art rejections. In the Appeal Brief, the Applicant first addressed the new matter objection. According to the Applicant, "a change does not equate to an addition" and "narrowing a specification's disclosure by deleting material is .... the antithesis of adding matter."  Turning to the § 101 rejection, the Applicant argued that claims should be interpreted in light of the amended specification; without the carriers and signals language in the specification, the claim was statutory.

The Examiner elaborated on his reasoning in the Answer:

The question here is given Appellant's specification would one of ordinary skill in the art interpret "information carrier" to include signals which are not statutory subject matter. The deletion of the phrase does not change what is meant by "information carrier". Appellant's specification states "Generally, carrier 970 is an article of manufacture having a computer-readable medium with computer-readable program code to cause the computer to perform methods of the present invention. Further, signal 980 can also include computer program product." Given this statement information carrier is would generally (most of the time) be a computer readable medium (as defined on pages 11 and 12 of the specification). However, an information carrier could also include the signal that holds the computer program product as stated.

The Applicant filed a Reply Brief. After noting that "removing material from the specification is specifically permitted by the [C.F.R.]", the Applicant explained that the Examiner's insistence that only originally filed matter be considered led to nonsensical results.

For example, if the reasoning in the Examiner's Answer were applied to the interpretation of claims, then the claims as originally-filed would indicate an intention on the part of an applicant to broadly claim his or her invention, any amendments to those claims would not and could not overcome that original intention, and the amended claims might never be allowed based solely on the original claiming intention of an applicant. The Appellant respectfully submits that this simply cannot be what the Patent statute and the rules of the Patent Office dictate ...

The Board reversed the § 101 rejection. The Board first noted that In re Nuijten required a rejection under § 101 "when the broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim covers a signal per se." However, the broadest reasonable interpretation should take into account the specification amendment that removed the "carriers and signals" sentence.

Thus, the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 14's preamble ("[a] computer program product tangibly embodied in an information carrier") only covers a computer program product embodied in physical media (i.e., a nontransitory tangible media). When the scope of the claim language is considered in light of Appellants' amended Specification, we conclude that the claimed "tangibly embodied in an information carrier" means "materially or physically" embodied in a physical media (non-transitory tangible media), and not embodied in non-physical media (transitory propagating signals).

My two cents: Not sure why the Applicant deleted from the spec rather than amended the claim to add "non-transitory." The appeal was filed back in 2009, and I don't think adding "non-transitory" was in vogue back then like it is now.

I've seen many Board decisions that affirmed § 101 rejections when the spec was silent about signals, so it's interesting that the Board used the absence of signals in the amended spec to reverse the rejection. The PTO's current position is that silence in the spec about signals and computer readable media means signals are covered:

The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim drawn to a computer readable medium (also called machine readable medium and other such variations) typically covers forms of non-transitory tangible media and transitory propagating signals per se in view of the ordinary and customary meaning of computer readable media, particularly when the specification is silent.
(PTO 2010 Memo "Subject Matter Eligibility of Computer Readable Media.")

Says who? How did the PTO decide that the ordinary and customary meaning of CRM covers signals?

The Applicant's blanket statement that deleting from the spec can't possibly be new matter ignored Federal Circuit precedent. When the Appeal Brief was filed in 2009, the controlling law was Baldwin Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Baldwin, the Federal Circuit held:

The examiner rightly refused to allow the applicants to amend the specification to remove references to `heat' as the way of sealing the sleeve," for the change "would have broadened the patent and introduced impermissible new matter" and rendered the reissue claims "invalid for lack of support in the initial disclosure." 

The Federal Circuit reiterated this position more recently in Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 601 F. 3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

Board reverses anticipation based on inherency when Applicant provides counterexamples

Takeaway: An Applicant appealed claims to a user interface and argued the limitation "determining a distance between the focus of attention and the display event." The Examiner relied on a drawing in an Excel user manual showing "tracer arrows," in conjunction with an inherency argument. Though the Examiner went to some effort to explain how one could draw inferences about what Excel was doing from the screen shot, the Applicant used counterexamples to demonstrate that Excel wasn't necessarily determining distance. (Ex parte Mackinlay, PTAB 2012.)
Details:
Ex parte Mackinlay
Serial No.  10/687,486; Tech Center 2100
Decided:  June 18, 2012

The claims were directed to aspects of a user interface. A representative claim on appeal read:

     1. A method of shifting attention comprising the steps of:
     determining the location for a focus of attention;
     determining a display event;
     determining the location of the display event;
     determining an attention shifting display element based on the display event, the determined location of the display event and the focus of attention; and
     determining a distance between the focus of attention and the display event;
     wherein the attention shifting display element is determined based on the determined distance, such that different types of attention shifting display elements are determined for different distances. 
(Emphasis added.)

The Examiner rejected the independent claim as anticipated by the printed publication "User's Guide Microsoft Excel, Version 5.0 1993" (Excel). The Examiner read the "determining an attention shifting element" on Excel's "tracer arrows to show the flow of data into a formula, based on the starting active cell within a worksheet, and the users choice of tracing precedents or dependents." The Examiner asserted that FIG. 4 of Excel taught "determining the distance 'length of the tracer arrow', from beginning active cell to the point of the arrow."

The Examiner elaborated on his reasoning in an Advisory Action:

Excel teaches a tracer arrow starting in one cell and ending in another cell, which is acknowledge by the Applicant. One of skilled art has to infer that some sort of calculations of the "length of the tracer arrow" has to be taken into consideration by the system in order to draw the arrow accordingly. Knowing the relative number of pixels between the two cells, as the Applicant states, provides measurements to the system for calculating how long to create the tracer arrow to achieve the goal of the arrow starting in one cell and ending in another.

On appeal, the Applicant argued the "determining a distance" limitation. The Applicant first explained that the reference did not explicitly teach the limitation:

The applied reference makes no indication or reference to the length of the tracer arrow, but instead discloses tracers that "track data flow by drawing arrows connecting the active cell with related cells on your worksheet. Tracer arrows point in the direction of data flow." See page 668, section "About Tracer Arrows" from Excel. Thus, Excel merely discloses that a trace arrow will originate in one cell and terminate in another cell.

The Applicant then attacked the Examiner's inherency argument by explaining how Excel could draw the tracer arrows without using distance:

[T]he graphic generating software used by Excel need only know the relative pixel coordinates between the two cells, not the distance. The arrow can then be drawn by many methods not requiring a calculation or determination of distance, for example determining the slope of the trace arrow and subsequently generating the trace arrow graphic starting at one cell and using the slope and horizontal range. In this example[,] no distance is calculated.

In the Answer, The Examiner elaborated on his inherency argument

     In order for Excel to automatically draw the "tracer" lines and arrows, the software application makes at least three determinations: 1) the location of the "active" cell; 2) the location of each "related" cell; and 3) the direction of the flow of data between the "active" cell and the "related" cells.
     Because Excel automatically makes these determinations and then automatically draws the "tracer" lines and arrows between the "active" cell and the "related" cells, Excel discloses determining a distance between the ''focus of attention" (i.e., the active cell) and the "display event" (i.e., the drawing of the "tracer" lines and arrows between the "active" cell and the "related" cells).

The Board agreed with the Applicant, finding that the reference did not disclose the feature at issue. With regard to inherency, the Board explained:

As pointed out by Appellants, there are at least two alternative ways to connect cells in a spreadsheet with tracer arrows, such as by connecting the respective cell coordinates, or by using a slope and horizontal range. In both alternatives proffered by Appellants (App. Br. 12-13), we agree that no distance determination is necessary.

The Board then reversed the anticipation rejection.

My two cents: A good example of the best way to beat an inherency argument: prove that the feature at issue is not actually required by demonstrating an alternative. The next time you make an inherency argument, spend a few minutes and see if you can come up with a counterexample. Your argument will be much more persuasive.

I do have one nitpick with the decision, in that I don't read the Applicant's inherency argument as offering two alternatives. Yes, the slope/range discussion is clearly one counter-example. But I'm not sure what the Board is referring to by "connecting respective cell coordinates". That sounds to me like the Applicant's characterization of the reference's explicit teachings. But hey, you only need one counterexample to win on inherency.