Thursday, March 10, 2016

Guest Post: Beware – Patent Prosecution Arguments Can Be Utilized as Evidence of Patent-Ineligible Concept Under §101

[Guest Post by Tyson Benson, a registered patent attorney and partner at Advent, LLP. Tyson's practice includes all aspects of patent prosecution and has experience drafting and prosecuting patent applications relating to integrated circuitry, electronics, medical devices, telecommunications, geographic information system technologies, graphics processing, computer networking, communications protocols, and computer architecture.]

In a recent decision handed down by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), PTAB introduced a new grounds for rejection under 35 U.S.C. §101 and supported this new ground for rejection with the Appellant’s arguments made during prosecution.

In Ex parte Hoitsma (Appeal 2014-003035 – decided March 4, 2016), the Appellant appealed the final rejection of a number of claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). The patent application at issue was directed to methods and apparatus for determining probability distribution functions and/or cumulative probability distributions. Claim 1 of the patent application is reproduced below:

     1.  A method comprising:
     receiving a plurality of values of an input variable at an input to a processor, wherein the input variable is representative of a physical characteristic of a component or system; and
     using the processor to implement a physics model to produce an estimate of an output for each of the input values;
     wherein the processor
          maps the output estimates to the input values by fitting the estimates to a plurality of curves;
          selects values from corresponding points on the curves to produce an output probability density or cumulative distribution function for the physical characteristic at a future time; and
          outputs the probability density or cumulative distribution function.
The technology could be utilized to predict the occurrence of defects such as cracks in components of an aircraft and the estimated crack lengths could be used to determine the probability that a crack length would exceed a predetermined threshold at some future time.

PTAB affirmed-in-part the final rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). However, as mentioned above, PTAB also introduced a new rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. After reciting the current state of the law (e.g., Alice, Mayo, etc.), PTAB applied the Mayo framework to the claims at issue.

The interesting part of this decision is that PTAB utilized the Appellant’s arguments during prosecution as evidence that the claims at issue were directed to a patent-ineligible concept (Mayo step 1). More specifically, PTAB held that the claims were directed to “a mathematical algorithm in the form of a probability distribution mapping function” and pointed to portions of the Applicant’s specification. Additionally, PTAB stated:
Our conclusion ...is reinforced is reinforced by Appellants’ arguments directed to the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Appellants’ arguments are focused solely on the probability density or cumulative distribution function (mathematical algorithm) encompassed by claims 1 and 11. For example, Appellants argue “Barajas et al. does not disclose or suggest that a probability density or cumulative distribution function for a physical characteristic at a future time can be produced by selecting values from corresponding points on a plurality of curves.”

PTAB went on to hold that there was no “inventive concept” under Mayo step 2. For instance, PTAB indicated that the processor was generic and purely conventional and that the inputs “encompass purely theoretical (made-up) input values to produce theoretical predictions of a theoretical component or system.”

As such, Applicants/Appellants should be mindful that arguments made during prosecution to differentiate claim language from the prior art may be utilized as evidence to support a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

8 comments:

  1. Applicants/Appellants should be mindful that arguments made during prosecution to differentiate claim language from the prior art may be utilized as evidence to support a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
    You HAVE to argue around the prior art. You cannot be afraid to argue a particular limitation just because the Board MAY use it against you in a 101 rejection.

    101 jurisprudence is a complete disaster because neither the Board nor the Federal Circuit doesn't understand that there is a difference between a claim "directed to" an abstract idea and an invention that "embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply ... abstract ideas." The Supreme Court made this distinction, but it appears lost on the rest of the decision makers.

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    1. Agreed that the subject matter eligibility jurisprudence is in a state of chaos. Congress never intended that inventors who came up with new and useful improvements to processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter would not be eligible to obtain patents therefor. One need only read Section 101 to see that. How can the quoted claim be read as anything but a new and useful improvement to a subject-matter-eligible process?

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    2. >You can't be afraid to argue
      >a limitation just because the Board
      >MAY use it against you in a 101

      I read the admonition in Tyson's post as merely one more factor to think about when making arguments.

      Sure, if the probablility limitation is the strongest (or only) distintion, then you argue that and risk (possible0 collateral damage.

      But maybe you think more carefully about the particular words you use in the argument, say, avoiding words like "mathematical" or "algorithhm" that evoke 101.

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  3. It's easy: 101 is the new 103. Claim 4 was deemed obvious and (seemingly) thus ineligible subject matter under 101. Claim 6 was deemed non-obvious, and its discussion is conveniently omitted from the Board's 101 analysis:

    >4. The method of claim 1, wherein the physical characteristic comprises a >crack length as a function of time or a time to failure as a function of >crack length.

    >6. The method of claim 1, wherein the curves are equi-probability curves.

    Of course, it's absurd that claim 6 passes 101 muster, but claim 4 does not except under the 101 is the new 103 doctrine.

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  4. Sam - Thank you for your comment. I agree - 101 is really an expanded non-novelty rejection. For example, one can distill each claim into its individual elements and state that element is "well-understood, routine, and conventional" (in addition to all of the other elements of the claim). Then, the sum of those claim elements is nothing more than the "well-understood, routine, and conventional" elements.

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    1. No problem; just relaying an insight (or view) I gained from the Patently-O comments.

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